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# POLICY BRIEF

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## Political Opportunities for the Extreme Right in Georgia

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### Executive Summary

Over the past several years, right-wing extremists have begun to proliferate in Georgia and their visibility has noticeably increased. More recently, far right groups even announced plans to form a joint party, the National Front, which will “take part in absolutely all political processes.”<sup>2</sup> This policy brief discusses whether there are favorable political opportunities for right-wing extremist actors in Georgia to mobilize. The legal system of the country includes laws that restrict extreme right rhetoric and action. However, an analysis of Georgia’s political space shows that right-wing extremist groups are indirectly supported, or at least not openly condemned, by the ruling party and other political actors. In addition, extreme right opinions largely coincide with general public attitudes, meaning that there are significant discursive opportunities for mobilization. After discussing the factors that contribute to potential mobilization opportunities for right-wing extremism, the brief presents policy options to counter this process.

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<sup>2</sup> Democracy and Freedom Watch. (2019). Georgian far-right groups reach agreement about forming new political party. Available from: <https://dfwatch.net/georgian-far-right-groups-reach-agreement-about-forming-new-political-party>

## Introduction

During the past 2-3 years, Georgia has witnessed several demonstrations organized by radical and extreme right groups. In 2016, for example, a group of masked youngsters attacked and vandalized mostly Turkish-owned restaurants and businesses;<sup>3</sup> in 2017, a large group of demonstrators rallied against George Soros, expressing support to Donald Trump and Viktor Orban;<sup>4</sup> in 2018, after a series of violent demonstrations, a fascist group marched with Nazi salutes in the center of Tbilisi.<sup>5</sup> LGBTQ activists fear that further clashes may occur in June 2019,<sup>6</sup> as one Georgian extreme right group, the Georgian March, has announced it will prevent the first ever LGBTQ pride in Tbilisi.<sup>7</sup>

These and similar events have naturally raised fears of right-wing extremism in Georgia. Those fears are heightened by the international trend of far right mobilization that has affected many other countries, including Italy, Germany, the US, and others.<sup>8</sup> These fears have led to numerous news reports, opinion pieces, and research on Georgian far right groups, some of which sensationalized the groups by using somewhat dramatic labels (e.g. Georgian Neo-Nazism,<sup>9</sup> and Russian March of Georgians<sup>10</sup>).

This policy brief applies the concept of the “extreme right,” defined as a combination of two elements: anti-constitutional and anti-democratic attitudes.<sup>11</sup> The former refers to distrust in the norms and procedures of modern democracies, and can range from militarism to the disapproval of liberal democratic policies. The latter refers to views that consider social inequality as natural or even necessary, and can be expressed in different exclusionary views, e.g. racism, xenophobia, nativism, etc. Hence, anti-constitutionalism is what makes right-wing extremism extreme, and anti-democratic sentiment is what makes right-wing extremism right-wing.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Badasyan, E. (2016). Georgian nationalists step out of the shade. JAM News. Available from: <https://jam-news.net/georgian-nationalists-step-out-of-the-shade/>

<sup>4</sup> Liberali. (2017). „ქართული იდეის“ საპროტესტო მსვლელობა თბილისში - „საქართველო ერთგულია ჭეშმარიტი ფასეულობების“. Available from: <http://liberali.ge/articles/view/27182/qartuli-ideis-saprotesto-msvleloba-tbilisshi-saqartvelo-ertgulia-cheshmariti-faseulobebis>

<sup>5</sup> Kincha, S. (2018). Labelling Georgia’s far right ‘pro-Russian’ is reductionist and counterproductive. Open Caucasus Media. Available from: <https://oc-media.org/opinion-labelling-georgias-far-right-pro-russian-is-reductionist-and-counterproductive/>

<sup>6</sup> Kevanishvili, E. (2019). ლგბტკი პრაიდი თბილისში - ტესტი პოლიციისთვის. აასრულებს თუ არა მუქარას „ქართული მარში“? Radio Tavisupleba. Available from

<sup>7</sup> Open Caucasus Media. (2018a). Tbilisi’s first queer pride announced for June. Available from: <https://oc-media.org/tbilisi-s-first-queer-pride-announced-for-june/>

<sup>8</sup> Caiani, M., D. Della Porta, and C. Wagemann. (2012). Mobilizing on the Extreme Right: Germany, Italy and the United States. Oxford University Press.

<sup>9</sup> Transparency International Georgia (2018). Anatomy of Georgian Neo-Nazism. Available from: <https://www.transparency.ge/en/blog/anatomy-georgian-neo-nazism>

<sup>10</sup> Gvarishvili, A. (2017). ქართველთა რუსული მარში. Tabula. Available from: <http://www.tabula.ge/ge/story/121936-qartvelta-rusuli-marshi>

<sup>11</sup> Carter, E. (2017). Party Ideology. In: Mudde, C. ed. The Extreme Right - A Reader. New York, Routledge

<sup>12</sup> Ravndal, J. (2018). Right-wing Terrorism and Militancy in the Nordic Countries: A Comparative Case Study. Terrorism and Political Violence. 30 (5). Pp.772-792.

Georgian right-wing extremists have diverse ideological stances and communication styles, even if the larger movement shares both anti-constitutional and anti-democratic attitudes. One of the oldest organizations in the Georgian extreme right movement is Georgian Idea, a group that aligns itself with a religious (in this case Orthodox Christian) belief system, which has been active since 2014.<sup>13</sup> Georgian Idea advocates the reinstatement of monarchy in Georgia and a “balanced” foreign policy, implying closer relations with Russia and the lack of support for Georgia’s aspirations towards EU and NATO.<sup>14</sup> Another prominent group, Georgian March, was created relatively recently, and seemingly spontaneously, after a large-scale anti-immigration demonstration in 2017.<sup>15</sup> Two other groups, Georgian National Unity<sup>16</sup> and Georgian Power,<sup>17</sup> are also relatively young (quite literally, too – both groups have a young membership base). These four groups have been behind most of the violent and large-scale events that have taken place over the past few years, and while Georgian Idea and Georgian March remain publicly active, Georgian National Unity and Georgian Power have recently moved to online activism.

So far, there is little indication that right-wing extremist actors in Georgia are ready to mobilize as a consolidated, powerful movement with a coherent ideology. Perhaps because right-wing extremism is relatively new to Georgian politics, even if ethno-national sentiments are not,<sup>18</sup> each actor seems to be looking for a specific political style. In the struggle for power and influence, some try to distinguish themselves with radical populist messages, while others resort to outright fascism.

Regardless of the current marginal position, however, the biggest danger these groups pose lies not in the immediate damage they cause (violent attacks, vandalism, etc.), but in the long-term consequences of their mobilization: their public appearances, however infrequent, carry the risk of the proliferation of right-wing extremist opinions. This implies more risks, since radicalized public opinion creates a fertile ground for an upsurge of populist radical right parties.<sup>19</sup> This has been the case in many countries, e.g. Sweden and the UK, where initially marginal groups gained nationwide and transnational power.<sup>20</sup> The more successful the far right becomes, the more the political discourse shifts to the extreme right, producing more policies based on exclusion.<sup>21</sup> In order to prevent the normalization of right-wing extremist opinions, the increased

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<sup>13</sup> Myth Detector (2018). Georgian Idea. Available from: <http://www.mythdetector.ge/en/profile/georgian-idea>

<sup>14</sup> Georgian Idea. (2018). Facebook. Available from: [https://www.facebook.com/IdeaAchara/?epa=SEARCH\\_BOX](https://www.facebook.com/IdeaAchara/?epa=SEARCH_BOX)

<sup>15</sup> Pertaia, L. (2017). Who was in and who was out in Tbilisi’s far-right March of Georgians [Analysis]. Open Caucasus Media. Available from: <https://oc-media.org/who-was-in-and-who-was-out-in-tbilisis-far-right-march-of-georgians-analysis/>

<sup>16</sup> Liberali. (2018).

<sup>17</sup> Badasyan, E. (2016).

<sup>18</sup> Nodia, G. (1995). Georgia's Identity Crisis. *Journal of Democracy*. 6(1) pp. 104-116. Project MUSE, DOI:10.1353/jod.1995.0014.

<sup>19</sup> Caiani, et al. (2012).

<sup>20</sup> Wodak, R. (2015). "Theories and Definitions: The Politics of Identity." In: Wodak, R.(ed.). *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean*. SAGE Publications.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

popularity of far right actors, and exclusion-oriented policies, it is necessary to first understand how these actors mobilize.

This policy brief discusses whether right-wing extremist actors in Georgia have favorable political opportunities for mobilization. To this end, it examines the openness of the legal system of the country, the accessibility of its political space, and the extent of public support for extreme right opinions. After identifying the factors contributing to the potential mobilization opportunities, the brief presents policy options to counter this process.

## Opportunities for Mobilization

In general, right-wing extremism can be seen as a social movement, since it represents a network of groups and individuals with a shared identity (or identities) and solidarity that engages in “politics by other means,” or unconventional actions that may involve violence.<sup>22</sup> The collective identity and solidarity of such networks can be rooted in religion, nationalism, or other issues.<sup>23</sup>

According to social movement theory, one of the main factors influencing the occurrence and level of mobilization is the extent of political opportunities available for the extreme right.<sup>24</sup> Political opportunities include the openness of the legal system of the country in which mobilization occurs, the extent of access of social movement groups to the political sphere, and discursive opportunities, i.e. the extent to which public opinion enables mobilization.<sup>25</sup> To understand whether right-wing extremists in Georgia have favorable political opportunities, therefore, it is necessary to review the legislation and the political space of the country, as well as the widespread attitudes of the public.

### *Openness of the Legal System*

Does the legislative framework of Georgia enable extreme right mobilization? To begin with, the Constitution of Georgia upholds the principles of liberal democracy, such as liberty (Article 12) and equality (Article 11).<sup>26</sup> While protecting freedom of assembly, the Constitution prohibits political associations that propagate war or violence and incite “national, local, religious or social animosity.”<sup>27</sup> In addition, the Criminal Code of

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<sup>22</sup> Della Porta, D. (2013). *Clandestine political violence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Caiani, et al. (2012).

<sup>26</sup> Constitution of Georgia. (1995). Available from:

<https://matsne.gov.ge/en/document/view/30346?publication=35>

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

Georgia prohibits crimes on discriminatory grounds, as well as racial discrimination.<sup>28</sup> Relatively recently, in 2014, Georgia also banned all forms of discrimination.<sup>29</sup> In addition to the general protection of liberty and equality and fight against discrimination, Georgia also bans agitation of fascist ideology, as well as fascist symbols, memorials and other types of propaganda.<sup>30</sup>

This brief overview of the relevant legislation suggests that the legal system does not offer opportunities for the mobilization to extreme right groups. Yet, even if the legislation corresponds to that of liberal democratic states, the execution of the law still depends on political will, which brings us to the political sphere. Does political space in Georgia enable extreme right mobilization?

Even though Georgian politics have been characterized as “vibrant,” with many diverse actors, political power largely remains divided between two parties: the ruling party, the Georgian Dream, and the main opposition party, the United National Movement (UNM).<sup>31</sup> Yet, in 2016, a conservative right-wing party, the Alliance of Patriots, did manage to obtain marginally more than 5% of votes and entered the Parliament together with the ruling party and the UNM.<sup>32</sup> Even with the relative success of the Alliance of Patriots, small parties struggle to obtain significant power in Georgia. This is due to the extremely high level of political polarization; indeed, Georgian politics have long been characterized by a “winner-takes-all” culture.<sup>33</sup> Moreover, in 2017, a new rule entered into force, banning parties from forming coalitions to overcome the 5% parliamentary threshold.<sup>34</sup> Therefore, since extreme and radical right actors are relatively small and, arguably, marginal, they lack access to formal institutions and decision-making levels.

### *Accessibility of the Political Space*

Despite the lack of access, extreme right ideas in Georgia have hardly been silenced. To begin with, the Georgian Dream party, which started as a coalition of ideologically diverse groups and individuals, has had a rather eclectic track record. At the level of high politics, government officials emphasize aspirations toward Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration and vocally support liberal democratic reforms.<sup>35</sup> However, Georgian Dream

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<sup>28</sup> Criminal Code of Georgia. Available from: <https://matsne.gov.ge/en/document/download/16426/157/en/pdf>

<sup>29</sup> The Law of Georgia on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination. Available from: <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5374993b4.pdf>

<sup>30</sup> Law of Georgia Charter of Liberty. Available from: <https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/1381526?publication=13>

<sup>31</sup> Freedom House. (2018). Nations in Transit. Available from: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2018/georgia>.

<sup>32</sup> Central Election Committee (CEC). (2016). Elections – 2016. Available from: <http://cesko.ge/eng/elections/2016>

<sup>33</sup> Democracy Reporting International. (2018). The high price of extreme political polarisation in Georgia (report). Available from: [https://democracy-reporting.org/dri\\_publications/the-high-price-of-extreme-political-polarisation-in-georgia-report/](https://democracy-reporting.org/dri_publications/the-high-price-of-extreme-political-polarisation-in-georgia-report/)

<sup>34</sup> Freedom House. (2018).

<sup>35</sup> United Nations Development Programme. (2018). Territorial integrity and European and Euro-Atlantic integration remain foreign policy priorities of the Georgian Parliament. Available from:



also has members who consider liberalism an unwanted and forced development in the country. A good, somewhat symbolic, manifestation was a recent initiative to remove the word “liberal” from the list of the main goals of state policy in the Law of Georgia on General Education.<sup>36</sup> The current wording of the law includes the formation of “civil awareness based on liberal and democratic values,”<sup>37</sup> and the authors of the initiative consider this goal a violation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

This ideological diversity sometimes leads to concessions to radical and extreme right actors. Indeed, in the past two years, such groups and individuals have often succeeded at bringing exclusion-oriented initiatives to the political agenda, while progressive and liberal initiatives are fiercely debated. Examples abound, from the redefinition of the concept of marriage in the Constitution to preclude same-sex marriages,<sup>38</sup> to the debate on removing sexual orientation and gender from the list of outlawed grounds for discrimination, as well as calls to ban abortion<sup>39</sup> and initiatives to make sexual education subject to parents’ approval.<sup>40</sup>

In addition, the ruling party rarely, if ever, takes a clear stance against right-wing extremism. Arguably, the first large-scale public demonstration of extremist attitudes in Georgia was May 17, 2013, when the demonstration to mark the International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia was crushed by violent groups. Almost six years later, nobody has been held responsible.<sup>41</sup> More recently, in May 2018, when a large group of radical demonstrators gathered to counter a rally protesting the police crackdown of Tbilisi’s popular nightclubs, the Minister of Internal Affairs asked the participants of the peaceful rally to disperse, warning of uncontrollable violence from radical groups.<sup>42</sup> Even though some of the extremist activists have been arrested and detained for violence during public demonstrations, in some cases, members of the ruling party, together with members of the Alliance of Patriots, served as guarantors for their release.<sup>43</sup>

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<http://www.ge.undp.org/content/georgia/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2018/territorial-integrity-and-european-and-euro-atlantic-integration.html>

<sup>36</sup> Radio Tavisupleba. (2019). პარლამენტში განათლების შესახებ კანონიდან სიტყვა “ლიბერალურის” ამოღებას განიხილავენ. Available from: <https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/29852647.html>

<sup>37</sup> Law of Georgia on General Education. Available from:

<https://matsne.gov.ge/en/document/download/29248/56/en/pdf>

<sup>38</sup> Tabula. (2018). საქართველოს კონსტიტუციის ახალი რედაქცია ძალაში შევიდა.

Available from: <http://www.tabula.ge/ge/story/141580-saqartvelos-konstituciis-axali-redaqcia-dzalashi-shevida>.

<sup>39</sup> Kachkachishvili, T. (2018). "სიცოცხლის მარში" აბორტის აკრძალვის მოთხოვნით. Radio Tavisupleba. Available from: <https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge>

<sup>40</sup> Chichua, N. (2019). კილაძე მიიჩნევს, რომ NGO-მ სექსობრივი განათლება “შშობლის ფილტრის გარეშე” არ უნდა შემოიტანოს. Netgazeti. Available from: <http://netgazeti.ge/news/352403/>

<sup>41</sup> Human Rights Education and Monitoring Center and Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group. (2015). Analysis of the Court Ruling on the Case of May 17, 2013. Available from: <https://emc.org.ge/en/products/2013-tslis-17-maisis-sakmestan-dakavshirebit-sasamartlos-ganachenis-analizi>

<sup>42</sup> Open Caucasus Media. (2018b). Interior minister apologises over Tbilisi nightclub raids as far-right groups plan daily protests. Available from: <https://oc-media.org/interior-minister-apologises-over-tbilisi-nightclub-raids-as-far-right-groups-plan-daily-protests/>

<sup>43</sup> On.ge. (2018). ბრეგაძე: ოცნებისა და პატრიოტთა ალიანსის დეპუტატთა ნაწილი მარშის წევრებს თავდებში უღებდა. Available from: <https://on.ge/story/22054>

Such an ambiguous stance towards right-wing extremism can be seen as a message of direct or indirect support. Extreme right actors can perceive that they might evade liability for their (verbally and physically) violent actions, and they may also perceive their views as tolerated, at the very least, if not legitimized, by the ruling party.

If the Georgian Dream is somewhat ambiguous, the Alliance of Patriots may appear as a more obvious ally to right-wing extremists. The party has a radical and populist right-wing orientation,<sup>44</sup> and its members have even been spotted attending violent demonstrations held by extremist groups.<sup>45</sup> Importantly, however, despite ideological similarities and occasional joint action, extra-parliamentary groups might still perceive the Alliance of Patriots as part of the political elite. Moreover, with its populist radical right rhetoric, the Alliance did fill a certain niche in the polarized political space in Georgia, thus crowding it out and excluding extra-parliamentary groups.

Therefore, if the legal system remains closed for extreme right mobilization, the political space in Georgia offers some, however limited, degree of access to extremist actors. Importantly, too, the Georgian Orthodox Church, the most trusted institution in the country,<sup>46</sup> also refrains from explicitly condemning right-wing extremism. After a series of demonstrations and violent counterdemonstrations in May 2018, for example, the Patriarchate published an official statement, according to which the demonstrators peacefully protesting the state's drug policy and violent raids of the police in the Bassiani nightclub had "created the basis for holding a counterdemonstration."<sup>47</sup>

The rather ambiguous stance of the Church is especially important since 89% of the population identifies as Orthodox Christian and 81% considers Orthodox Christianity as the most important component of national identity.<sup>48</sup> In addition, 84% of the population trusts the Church more than any other institution.<sup>49</sup> The level of trust in the Church considerably outweighs that in any other organization, institution, or political figure, including the Parliament (34%), the Prime Minister (34%), political parties (25%), the police (50%), the legislative branch (25%), the media (19%) and non-governmental organizations (23%). Furthermore, the general belief in democracy has fallen over time, dropping to 52% in 2017, and trust towards the government, which temporarily increased after the 2012 elections, fell to 26% in 2017.

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<sup>44</sup> Stephan, A. (2018). Defining the far right in Georgia: From neo-fascists to populist parties. Georgian Institute of Politics. Available from: <http://gip.ge/defining-the-far-right-in-georgia-from-neo-fascists-to-populist-parties/>

<sup>45</sup> Tabula. (2018). ქსენოფობიური ულტრანაციონალისტური ჯგუფები რუსთაველის გამზირზე აქციას მართავენ. Available from: <http://www.tabula.ge/ge/story/132700-qsenofobiuri-ultranacionalisturi-jgufebi-rustavelis-gamzirze-aqcias-martaven>

<sup>46</sup> Pew Research Center. (2018).

<sup>47</sup> Patriarchate of Georgia. (2018). საქართველოს საპატრიარქოს განცხადება (13.05.2018). Available from: <http://patriarchate.ge/geo/saqartvelos-sapatriarqos-gancxadeba-13-05/>

<sup>48</sup> Pew Research Center. (2018).

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

## *Public Support*

While the somewhat ambiguous stance of the Patriarchate and political actors may be perceived as indirect support by the extreme right, public opinion in Georgia provides the clearest message that there is demand for policies supporting ethnonationalism and the exclusion of diverse groups, e.g. national and ethnic minorities, religious minorities, the LGBTQ community, immigrants, etc. Opinion surveys indicate that Georgians are traditionalist and ethnocentric, with 85% believing Georgian culture to be superior to that of any other nation.<sup>50</sup> Most people remain hesitant in terms of accepting diverse ways of life: 54% of Georgians would not want a homosexual neighbor and 42% consider that it is not important to protect the rights of gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgenders.<sup>51</sup> A considerable part of society opposes immigration and has a negative attitude towards foreigners; opinion polls show that people from Turkey and Iran, as well as Muslims in general, are considered least favorable. Notably, the majority of people with anti-immigration or xenophobic attitudes state that they have not interacted in person with immigrants or foreigners, meaning that these disapproving stances are based on second-hand – not necessarily accurate – impressions.<sup>52</sup>

These indicators point to the fact that discursive opportunities for extreme and radical right in Georgia are considerably high. Given the societal demand for actors who would voice the opinions of the majority publicly and for more exclusion-oriented policies, there is large potential for extremist mobilization. Indeed, a general overview of the rhetoric of extreme right groups in Georgia indicates that they try to respond to these public attitudes through their anti-establishment, anti-media, anti-immigration, anti-LGBT statements.

## Conclusion

This brief overview of political opportunities for right-wing extremism in Georgia shows that while the legal system of the country restricts opportunities for mobilization, public opinion does lean towards more exclusionary attitudes and policies. Given the existence of societal demand, it is up to other political actors to take measures against right-wing extremism.

For now, Georgian extreme right movement remains small, fragmented, and relatively marginal. Yet, the availability of political opportunities implies that there is no safeguard against new or stronger actors. Thus, even if the existing four organizations remain

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<sup>50</sup> Pew Research Center. (2018). Eastern and Western Europeans Differ on Importance of Religion, Views of Minorities, and Key Social Issues. Available from: <http://www.pewforum.org/2018/10/29/>

<sup>51</sup> Caucasus Research Resource Center. (2018a). Georgia's Imagined Tolerance. Available from: <http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2018/11/georgias-imagined-tolerance.html>

<sup>52</sup> Caucasus Research Resource Center. (2016). The Population of Georgia on Immigrants. Available from: <http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2016/03/the-population-of-georgia-on-immigrants.html>.



marginal, a new, potentially charismatic and popular extremist actor could use the available opportunities more effectively.

Even if such extremist actors do not appear in the near future, the normalization of extremist narratives entails long-term risks. More specifically, extreme right rhetoric raises the possibility of further radicalization of societal attitudes, meaning more potential support for far right actors and more room for policies oriented at exclusion. As mentioned above, during the past two years, Georgia has already witnessed several such initiatives.

In order to address these long-term consequences of right-wing extremism, it is necessary to address the political opportunities that enable mobilization in the first place. This includes both discursive opportunities and the potential access of right-wing extremists to the political space.

## Recommendations

### **For the Georgian Government:**

- To recognize the media, NGOs, and research institutions working on right-wing extremism as partners in the fight against extremism and cooperate with them;
- To elaborate a research-based strategy against extreme and radical right mobilization;
- To address discursive opportunities for the extreme right by:
  - Specific measures against fake news and propaganda, for example, through the collection and effective communication of detailed statistical data on the actual scope of immigration to Georgia;
  - A strategy to increase public trust in state institutions;
  - Concrete steps to raise public awareness on hate speech and hate crime;
- To address political opportunities for right-wing mobilization by:
  - Explicitly condemning right-wing extremism and violence;
  - Refraining from direct and indirect support to extremist actors;
  - Reaffirming commitment to the principles of liberal democracy, refraining from populist, anti-immigrant, anti-LGBTQ, etc. statements;

### **For the Patriarchate of Georgia:**

- To address opportunities for right-wing mobilization by:
  - Explicitly condemning violence, including right-wing extremist attacks;
  - Refraining from direct and indirect support to extremist actors;

### **For civil society organizations:**

- To address discursive opportunities for the extreme right by:

- Conducting detailed scientific research on extreme and radical right groups and narratives in Georgia and communicating evidence-based findings to the wider society and the Government;
- Refraining from sensationalized coverage of right-wing extremist mobilization and superficial or simplified conclusions when spreading information on far right groups;
- Organizing campaigns to raise public awareness on hate speech and hate crime;
- Monitoring and countering the spread of fake news and propaganda.
- To address legal and political opportunities for extreme right mobilization by:
  - Acting as a watchdog to monitor potential political opportunities for extreme right mobilization;
  - Pressuring and cooperating with the Government to take specific measures against right-wing extremism.



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