© Originally Published by Reunir Horizon
A couple of weeks before what was described by many as a decisive parliamentary election in October of 2024, the Georgian Institute of Politics published two hypothetical scenarios outlining potential outcomes: one in which the Georgian Dream stays in power; the other foreseeing a change of the ruling party. On the basis of the election results, whose fairness and legitimacy are still being contested both internally and externally, the Georgian Dream has formed a single-party majority in the parliament and remains in power. Unfortunately, these developments suggest the early stages of the first, worst-case scenario outlined in our previous publication.
The lack of internal and external legitimacy of the ruling party, along with the decision to suspend the EU integration process until 2028, has led to a deep political crisis.
The crisis keeps growing with an alarming increase in systematic violence, arrests, and beatings of the protesters by the police, described by human rights watchdogs as torture.
Further alienating itself from the Georgian population, the ruling party on December 14, 2024 completed its plan to grab total control of the state institutions by naming as president a person most loyal to the regime and with no potential of acting as a strong balancer to the government.
These developments beg to question where Georgia’s political crisis is heading; what could be its short and long-term implications; and what should Western partners do to ensure that the country does not become a full-blown authoritarian state? We offer 3 potential scenarios and the implications of each of these hypothetical turns of events.
Scenario One: Belarusization of Georgia
Ensuring that the post of the president is taken by a person with no resources or background to act as a strong, independent player, the Georgian Dream completes its subordination of all state institutions and de jure cements its capture of the state. The next step is to fully implement the so-called “Russian law” in order to crack down on civil society organisations, the free media, and any other critical voices. To cleanse the state institutions from people who might be critical of the government’s policies, the ruling party will double down on the initiated changes to regulations of the public sector to more easily dismiss officials, and a proposed amendment that facilitates recruiting people to work for the police force. The latter is aimed at building up manpower for further violent dispersion of protesters. Similar repressive actions are expected towards academic institutions.
If things go as described above, then this could lead to the country’s further estrangement and isolation from the democratic international community.
Georgia would become just another authoritarian post-Soviet “pariah” state that serves as a shadow economy and a grey zone for circumventing sanctions.
Alienation from the West logically pushes Georgia more towards Russia, potentially opening up the country’s state institutions for the Kremlin’s infiltration and political submission. Despite the crackdowns, the protests are most likely to continue, leading to increasing Russian involvement and potentially even direct support through military personnel. This option was already indicated by some Russian officials and successfully tested in Kazakhstan in 2022, just before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. While this might ‘stabilise’ the situation and prolong Georgian Dream’s rule for some time, the results are going to be consequential. Most likely, Georgia will see an alarming acceleration of brain drain, economic shocks, and dependence on Russian subsidies.
Scenario Two: Status quo Remains
In this scenario, the Georgian Dream does not give up its one-party grip on the government and still manages to achieve the promised “restart” of relations with the West. The Trump administration’s isolationist foreign policy and preoccupation with China allow the GD to make the status quo acceptable in the West. However, this would also imply certain concessions from the ruling party, for instance reviewing the “foreign agent law”.
Georgia-EU relations would be comparable to how Serbia is currently being perceived in Brussels. While Serbia is a candidate country formally committed to the process of European integration, the leadership in Belgrade maintains close ties with the Kremlin whilst the fairness of its elections is being questioned.
Georgia could be classified as a case of competitive authoritarianism, where formal democratic institutions still exist and are being viewed as a means of gaining power, yet the ruling party has a significant advantage in the elections due to the abuse of state resources.
This scenario is not sustainable, as it implies continued protests and societal discontent. Georgia already saw some officials and ambassadors resigning amidst the recent developments and this trend is likely to increase as the political crisis deepens. Constant political instability could eventually lead to a snap parliamentary election (Scenario 3) or a turn towards authoritarianism (Scenario 1).
Meanwhile, Western partners will likely be in waiting mode. While relations with Georgia will be downgraded and targeted sanctions may be adopted, economic isolation is less likely. Georgia’s EU accession process, however, will remain suspended until further notice.
Scenario 3: Rose Revolution 2.0
In this third scenario, continued internal and external pressure starts bearing fruit. The Georgian Dream is forced to find a political way out of its confrontation with civil society. Similar to what happened during the Rose Revolution in 2003 or the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, the judiciary annuls the election results. Under the new electoral administration and close supervision of the legitimate President Zourabichvili and Western partners, new parliamentary elections are held sometime in early Spring of 2025. Most likely, Georgian Dream would survive as a viable political force, but opposition parties manage to form a coalition government. Georgia would experience a restart of reforms.
The coalition government (something contemporary Georgia has no experience with) would boost democratisation and liberalisation policies, re-dynamise the Associated Trio (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine), re-open EU membership negotiations and deepen cooperation with NATO.
On the other hand, if US president Trump waves efforts to stop the active phase of the war in Ukraine as soon as he is sworn in, then Georgia might face increasing vulnerabilities and economic shocks: hybrid attacks by Russia, possible economic and transport embargoes and visa restrictions, leading to a drastic drop in Georgian remittances from Russia.
Potential Pitfall: Escalation into Conflict
Indeed, the optimistic scenario of a Rose Revolution 2.0 could unravel disastrously. Similar to Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity, escalating unrest in Georgia might spiral into violent civil confrontations, leading to widespread bloodshed. Such instability could invite military provocations from Russia, further endangering Georgia’s territorial integrity and security. Although a full-scale war remains improbable, the Kremlin could exploit the chaos through hybrid warfare or localized military actions, further undermining Georgia’s sovereignty. These developments could shift the focus away from political processes and provide the incumbent regime with an opportunity to consolidate power under the guise of ensuring national security. Internationally, such escalation would further tarnish Georgia’s reputation, weaken its ties with the West, and increase its vulnerability to external manipulation.
Conclusion
At the time of writing, the political situation in Georgia remains highly unstable and volatile. As outlined above, there are at least three directions in which this crisis could develop: full authoritarianism, status quo or regime change.
Georgia represents a critical geopolitical bottleneck for the South Caucasus region. If it falls, then the EU risks losing access to the entire region, including rapprochement with Armenia, and endangering connectivity to the landlocked states of Central Asia. For Russia, such developments would strengthen its influence on Middle as well as North-South corridors to reach out Iran, Turkey, the Gulf states and beyond, consolidating its strategic influence in the region. Additionally, an autocratic Georgia could bolster China’s role, facilitating investments in Georgia’s critical infrastructure, including ports, railways, and telecommunications.
Internal, societal pressure is vital to return Georgia to the democratic path. A coalition government would restore checks and balances and depoliticise public institutions. In this transitionary period before new parliamentary elections in the Spring of 2025, the role of the legitimate President Zourabichvili would be of vital importance to ensure the process goes smoothly and averts new crisis. No less important is the international community’s involvement and Western support.
In order to stop Georgia from becoming another failed state that has fallen victim to an authoritarian pariah regime, Western partners need to be more actively engaged with civil society and other democratic actors in Georgia.
Although the unpredictability of Trump’s administration, the outcome of the upcoming German elections, and terms of peace in Ukraine are going to be major determinants, Western partners need to make sure that Georgia remains on the agenda and that decision makers in Tbilisi are pressured to find a solution to the crisis and return the country to normalcy.
