As Georgia approaches decisive parliamentary elections on October 26, questions swirl regarding the potential implications. The Tbilisi government continues to freefall from the West, making the composition of the next legislative term either reverse this alarming trend or accelerate it further.
Relations between the US and Georgia are at a low point, and the country’s EU membership candidacy status and visa-free travel regime are under threat of being revoked.
Hence, it is consequential for the future of Georgia if the upcoming elections are recognised as free and fair and whether the ruling party will maintain its one-party grip on power. The outcome will determine whether Georgians can recoup their significant progress toward EU membership and continue building a European state to eventually join the EU or risk reverting to post-Soviet stagnation. This analysis offers two possible scenarios on how the situation in Georgia could develop during this crucial period and explores the consequences on the country’s internal and foreign policies.
Scenario One—The Status Quo Remains
In the first scenario, GD which possesses overwhelming administrative and oligarchic resources, through intimidation, voter buying and fraud, the ruling party wins the elections and forms a one-party majority in the parliament. Georgian political leadership will remain defensive and unwilling to compromise its own political agenda. This may lead to a deeper political crisis and a repressive response from the government. Neither internal nor external pressure can push it toward more democratisation and power sharing. On the contrary, the ruling Georgian Dream party consolidates its political monopoly, turning the country into Belarus-style authoritarianism under an informal ruler-oligarch. Such a result would give carte blanche to Georgian Dream to complete its state capture process. New constitutional changes have moved the presidency from popular elections to a parliamentary college of electors. Presidential elections are to take place only months after the October elections, and in this scenario, the college would be dominated by Georgian Dream.
Another implication—as was already promised—will be the persecution and oppression of opposition political parties, critical media and civil society.
Georgia’s so-called Russian-style foreign agent law will probably be used in full swing to intimidate political watchdogs. Consequently, this would lead to increased nihilism across society, resulting in a major brain drain, especially among the youth.
This scenario will also be highly disquieting for foreign policy. Any distancing from the West implies a Georgian pivot toward Russia, Iran and China. In other words, the current ruling party’s multi-vector foreign policy will become official policymaking in Tbilisi. We would see the freezing of European integration probably replaced by deepening partnerships with Eurasian illiberal powers and alliances, such as the 3+3 format (Turkey, Iran, Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), BRICS or the Eurasian Economic Union.
Georgia may lose its credibility among international donors and funds, leading to a drastic decrease in direct foreign investments. If the US enacts the Georgian People’s Act (‘To Support Democracy and the Rule of Law in Georgia, and for Other Purposes’), considerable funding may be lost for large infrastructural projects from Western donors, allowing China and Russia to step in.
Worsening relations with the West, particularly with the US, also pressurises Georgian diplomatic efforts to maintain the Non-Recognition Policy of Russian occupied territories.
Although the West continues to offer unwavering support for Georgia’s territorial integrity, one could expect its diminishment—even though it has defended Georgia’s strategic interests.
The first scenario has two sub-scenarios. In the unlikely setting that Georgian Dream wins enough mandates to form a government and a constitutional majority, the country will accelerate into full-scale authoritarianism, international isolation and dependence on Moscow. We may see the recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the forming of some kind of confederation with them under Kremlin tutelage.
The other, less likely sub-scenario sees Georgian Dream winning in free and fair elections and ruling either as a single party or in a coalition with smaller parties. Consequences could be freezing Georgia’s EU candidate status and visa-free travel, creating a Turkish-style governing apparatus.
Scenario Two—The Opposition Wins
In the second possible scenario, opposition parties get enough votes to collectively outnumber Georgian Dream and form a coalition. Since almost all of the larger opposition parties prioritise Euro-Atlantic integration, Georgia would then experience a refresh and restart of reforms.
This new government might well boost democratisation and liberalisation policies, restoring the Associated Trio (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine), enhancing EU membership negotiations and deepening cooperation with NATO. This scenario implies closer relations with the US on trade and travel, and the suggested Megobari act that could sanction Georgian officials who undermine democracy.
On the other hand, this scenario could lead to increasing risks and vulnerabilities for Georgia.
Although direct military intervention by Russia is not likely due to the war in Ukraine, we can expect increased Russian hybrid warfare tactics targeting Georgian society and the occupied territories. Tension with the Kremlin could also lead to economic and transport embargos and visa restrictions, leading to a drop in Georgian remittances from Russia, thus inflicting short-term but major shocks to the Georgian economy.
On the domestic front, a coalition government implies restoring checks and balances and depoliticising public institutions. While reaching a consensus on all issues among coalition partners would be challenging, any democratisation could enhance Georgia’s credibility among international donors and business elites. This could increase shares of Western investments in infrastructural projects, particularly large ones such as the Anaklia Deep Sea Port. The probability of such a scenario depends heavily on the extent to which political forces in the country are willing and ready to put aside their personal ambitions and cooperate with the Georgian public and civil society. During coalition government transitional period, the active involvement and participation of international partners is necessary to ensure that the returning to democratic path goes smoothly and aligns with European standards.
The second scenario also has two sub-scenarios. First, political parties form a functional coalition and follow President Salome Zourabichvili’s proposals, agreeing on a technocratic government and prime minister overseeing reforms. The other sub-scenario is more extreme. Political parties may fail to form any coalition, leading to a stalemate and possibly snap parliamentary elections. This route would not necessarily uproot Georgia’s EU candidate status or visa-free regime but would stall its EU integration progress. Further, any potential political crisis could create opportunities for the Kremlin to interfere and cause instability.
Conclusion
The political situation in Georgia remains unstable and rather unpredictable. Georgian society as well as the international community must be prepared for any unexpected development or even more prolonged political crisis or stalemate. Post-election, the formation of the new Georgian government and the stability of the domestic political situation will determine both Western and Russian approaches. The two main ensuing scenarios—status quo or reformation—are not exhaustive. Much will depend on international and internal factors. Of significance will be the war’s outcome in Ukraine and the US presidential elections on November 5 on whether Georgia follows a pro-Western course or remains in the Kremlin’s shadow.
