Psychological Resilience in Georgia: Confronting the Challenge of Information Threats

This policy paper explores how small frontline states can combat information threats using Georgia as a case study. Since the 1990s, Georgia has been a frontline state, caught between overlapping Russian and Western interests in the geopolitically contested Black Sea region. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent intensification of Russia-West geopolitical rivalry have further amplified Georgia’s vulnerability to intensified information threats and malign influence from illiberal powers.

The aim of this study is to provide a comprehensive understanding of how hostile information activities threaten the psychological resilience of Georgian society, and what role the Georgian media, civil society, political actors, and the international community play in either exacerbating or mitigating these vulnerabilities.

Methodologically, this research primarily employs qualitative methods, including the tools of both desk and field research. The desk research component comprises an analysis of primary and secondary sources, while the field research component includes interviews with Georgian and foreign security experts as well as focus groups involving representatives of the Georgian media.

NATO defines information threats as “intentional, harmful, manipulative and coordinated activities conducted by state and non-state actors, which can include but is not limited to information manipulation and interference by foreign actors, information operations, and disinformation. These activities are used to create confusion, sow division, destabilise societies, influence perceptions and behaviours, and ultimately have a negative impact on NATO, Allies and partners” (NATO 2024).

Building on this cooperative approach, NATO has developed a range of responses (both proactive and reactive) to information threats as well as short, medium, and long-term strategies. These strategies offer flexibility, and can be scaled up or down based on the nature of the threat, and align with NATO’s strategic communications objectives and priorities. The responses are structured around four key functions: Understand, Prevent, Contain and Mitigate, and Recover (ibid).

Psychological resilience is another key concept. According to the Oxford Bibliographies, psychological resilience refers to individuals’ and societal groups’ capacity to recover from, or resist misfortune speedily and easily. In statecraft, it has come to denote not only recovery from stresses and disturbances, or “bouncing back” to previous normalcy, but also a “bouncing forward” effect through adaptation. The latter can be considered desirable despite the general negativity attached to being vulnerable to continuous external shocks. The Swedish approach to psychological defense is to strengthen the population’s ability to detect and resist malign influence campaigns and disinformation, thereby contributing to resilience and a willingness to defend the country.

The key finding of our analysis is that the low degree of psychological resilience in Georgia undermines the country’s responsiveness to information threats and exacerbates its negative impacts. This partly arises from the fact that Georgia is characterized by a wide gap in perceptions regarding the country’s key objectives and risks among different segments of society and the political class.

Tackling complex information threats requires a diverse toolbox of countermeasures embedded within a whole-of-society approach. This implies the involvement of all main actors – including independent fact-checkers, policymakers, and academics – working collaboratively. However, Georgia currently lacks precisely this: its society is divided, and its political class is deeply polarized. The recent shift by the Georgian government towards a socially conservative ideological platform, coupled with a reorientation of its foreign policy towards illiberal actors and away from the West, has further eroded Georgia’s capacity to effectively counter information threats. The ruling party’s policy objective – to maintain power indefinitely and restructure the country’s institutions to ensure its continued rule – further weakens the country’s resilience against information threats. Perceptions of electoral fraud and injustice from recent parliamentary elections (Gutbrod 2024) have led to public discontent and exacerbated societal divisions while weakening shared identities, thus making Georgia increasingly vulnerable to external malign influence. It also diminishes the psychological resilience of Georgian society.

In this context, it is useful to compare Georgia’s situation with other small states that have faced somewhat similar challenges, such as Estonia. This paper examines Estonia’s long-standing fight against Russian information threats and how the Baltic state has managed to mitigate threats and maintain resilience against recurring information threats. There are many best practices that Georgia can learn from Estonia – including comprehensive state strategies and a more coordinated whole-of-society approach among government, media, and civil society. However, significant differences exist between the two countries that make Georgia inherently more vulnerable to information threats. One key distinction is the geopolitical environment: unlike Estonia, Georgia has been denied major security guarantees from the West. Georgia’s NATO accession aspirations have not come close to fruition (Cecire 2022), and the EU has neglected Georgia’s precarious security situation for decades (Sabanadze 2022). At the same time, Russia’s unprovoked aggression against Ukraine demonstrated the Russian Federation’s willingness to employ direct military force against its neighbors to restore its regional hegemony (Kakachia 2024).  This lack of even minimal deterrence against Russia has contributed to widespread perceptions within Georgia about the nation’s defenselessness. The humiliating experience of the 2008 Russia-Georgia War and the continuous violations of Georgia’s territorial integrity by Russia, in the form of “borderization,” (Kakachia 2018) have further scarred the Georgian psyche. This history makes Georgia a fertile ground for information threats coming from Russia and explains why the “peace card” remains so appealing to the Georgian population. These vulnerabilities are further exacerbated by high-ranking government officials’ negative framing of the EU and NATO. In recent years, GD leaders have consistently portrayed further NATO integration as a recipe for repeated Russian invasions of Georgia (Light 2024) and have blamed the EU for interfering in Georgian affairs and threatening Georgian identity.

The remainder of this policy paper will discuss best practices for combating information threats and strengthening societal resilience, drawing on Estonia’s experiences, and highlighting potential lessons for Georgia. The paper concludes with policy-relevant recommendations for Georgian state institutions and society on how to effectively combat information threats.

Policy Paper #47 | Januart 2025

This publication was produced with the financial support of NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division and the British Embassy in Tbilisi. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division, the British Embassy in Tbilisi, and the Georgian institute of politics.